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We show that the quantum nature of light can be used to hide a secret message within a photo-
graph. Using this physical principle we achieve information-theoretic secure steganography, which
had remained elusive until now. The protocol is such that the digital picture in which the secret
message is embedded is perfectly undistinguishable from an ordinary photograph. This implies that,
on a fundamental level, it is impossible to discriminate a private communication from an exchange
of photographs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication is crucial in human society. As we
become more connected, our ability to safeguard and
protect our communications becomes critical. Although
privacy of correspondence is a right granted by the con-
stitution of most countries [1], technical solutions must
guarantee this right in practice. Cryptography [2] aims
at making a message incomprehensible to the unautho-
rized reader, however it does not guarantee privacy: the
fact that an encrypted message is being exchanged can be
discovered by observing encrypted (random) data within
a communication.
Steganography provides a solution by concealing the
existence of the message in an innocent support. Histori-
cally, Histaeus, tyrant of Miletus, instructed Aristagoras
to revolt by sending him a message tattooed on a slave’s
scalp, under his hair. Later, stegosystems continued to
play a historical role, notable examples are the invisible
inks used during the American Revolution and the mi-
crodots used in World War II. Nowadays, steganography
often looks at hiding information in a digital image [3, 4].
Today, governments are proposing compromises be-
tween privacy and security, exploring the idea of pro-
hibiting unbreakable encryption protocols. In this con-
text, the question of whether such a protocol can be fun-
damentally undetectable is important: if a perfectly se-
cure steganographic scheme exists, any attempt at pro-
hibiting secret communications, e.g. by weakening cryp-
tographic protocols, is vain. We consider the following
setting: Ward is a security agent examining an innocent-
looking photograph sent by Alice to Bob. Ward has to
decide whether this photograph contains a secret mes-
sage or not. Is it, at least in principle, possible for Ward
to make this decision?
Although it has been shown that perfectly secure
steganography is in principle possible, a protocol has not
been proposed [5, 6]. Here we show that the quantum
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nature of light [7, 8] can be used to perfectly hide the
existence of a secret message in a photograph.
First, we will give the context and setting for steganog-
raphy, followed by an overview of the state of the art and
its limits. We then describe a protocol that uses the
presence of shot noise (quantum noise) within a photo-
graph to hide information perfectly. A proof-of-principle
experiment is shown in the Supplementary Material.
II. DIGITAL IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY
As described in Fig. 1, steganography on digital
images is nowadays mostly based on embedding a secret
message T into a cover-image C. A cover image is an
innocent-looking digital image used to hide the secret
content to protect. When this image C contains the
secret message T , i.e. once the embedding of T has
been performed, then it is referred to as stego-image
and denoted by S. The image S can then be distributed
over the Internet without arising suspicion [4, 5, 9].
The secret message is embedded using the embedding
key. Once the receiver gets the stego-image S, it can
retrieve the hidden message T using the corresponding
extraction key. The case where the embedding key is the
same as the extraction key is referred to as secret-key
steganography. Instead, in public-key steganography the
embedding key and the extraction key are not identical.
Aiming at information-theoretically secure steganogra-
phy, in our work we consider secret-key steganographic
schemes only. In fact public-key steganography is
information-theoretically impossible, as proven in [10].
In our setting, Ward has to decide whether a certain
digital image contains an embedded message or not. This
means that Ward is dealing with a hypothesis test prob-
lem, as pointed out by Cachin in [11]. A steganographic
scheme is perfectly secure if Ward cannot detect the pres-
ence of any message which has been embedded with this
scheme.
This can only happen if the stego-image S is drawn
from the same statistical distribution as the cover-image
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FIG. 1. Illustration of a generic image steganography pro-
tocol: Alice embeds the cleartext in a photograph to form a
stego-image. This image is published where Bob can find it.
Bob then extract the cleartext from the image.
C. If that is the case, then it is referred to as a perfectly
secure steganographic scheme. However, the embedding
of any object will inevitably modify the statistical distri-
bution of the hosting digital image.
Although the distortions due to embedding cannot be
perceived by human eyes, they can be detected from a
statistical point of view. More precisely, let us denote
with C the statistical distribution of the pixels in the
cover-image C and with S the one for the stego-image
S. As the picture S has been obtained through embed-
ding from the picture C, then the statistical distribution
S diverges from C. The distance between these two dis-
tributions C and S is quantified by the Kullback-Leiber
divergence [11], denoted by DKL(C||S). In the discrete
case, which is our case of interest, this value is defined
as:
DKL(C||S) :=
∑
i C(i) log C(i)S(i) .
Specifically, the Kullback-Leiber divergence of S from
C is the relative entropy between the two distributions,
as it measures the loss of information when S approxi-
mates C. Performing the embedding leads to a Kullback-
Leiber divergence strictly greater than zero. An example
is shown in Fig. 2, where the distortion introduced by the
technique of the Least-Significant-Bit (LSB) replacement
is immediately visible. For an accurate description of this
technique we refer to [9]. Other common steganographic
techniques can be found in Refs. [12] and [13].
In some approaches (see [14, 15]), zero Kullback-
Leiber divergence is achieved at the expense of employ-
ing an always larger amount of hosting signal (i.e. in the
cover-image C) for statistical restoration. However, these
approaches do not scale: for a constant risk of detection,
the amount of data that can be hidden is proportional
to the square-root of the total size of the image material
sent [16], so that if Alice sends a constant flow of images
to Bob, the amount of data that she can embed per image
quickly goes to zero.
Instead of embedding, i.e. attempting to emulate the
original statistical distribution of the cover image, which
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FIG. 2. Histogram of the pixel values of a homogenous area
of a photograph (a) and the obvious effects of encoding en-
crypted data on the Least-Significant Bit of each pixel (b).
The effect is visible even if the probability of the least signif-
icant digit being 1 is exactly 0.5.
necessarily leads to distortion, our scheme creates the
stego-image S by directly sampling the space C of cover
images, ensuring zero distortion.
III. PROTOCOL
We propose a secret-key steganographic protocol where
two digital pictures are involved. This is in contrast with
the common steganographic strategies where the protocol
takes into account one digital picture only, i.e. the cover-
image. In our framework, one picture is the key-image
K, and the other is the cover-image C, which is discarded
as soon as the stego-image S is created. The randomness
in our protocol is given by the shot noise (quantum noise)
naturally present in all images [17].
We take the point-of-view of Ward, and assume that
Alice has the capability of satisfying the following as-
sumptions:
i) The state of the camera and the subject remain
unchanged between the taking of two consecutive
photographs.
ii) Each pixel is statistically independent, i.e. one can
not predict the value of one pixel by the knowledge
of the others better than the shot noise limit.
In the following we describe the protocol, also illus-
trated in Fig. 3. Alice wants to secretly communicate a
message T to Bob. Alice takes two photographs, K and
C. In order to fulfill assumption (i), she uses the same
camera and takes the pictures of the same static subject
in rapid succession. As this is a secret-key stegano-
graphic protocol, the photograph K is shared with Bob
over a private channel (for example, they can meet in
person). According to Kerckhoffs’s principle [18], the
3protocol is aborted if the key-image K is seen by Ward.
The i-th bit of the message T is denoted by Ti, while
the i-th pixel value of the images K, C, and S is denoted
by Ki, Ci, and Si ∈ N0, respectively. The secret mes-
sage T is encoded within the stego-image S. The pixels
composing such image S are taken either from K or C,
according to the following rule:
Si :=
{
Ki, if Ti = 0
Ci, if Ti = 1
(1)
Once the stego-image S is constructed, Alice sends it
to Bob through a public channel. The cover-image C is
then destroyed. On his side, Bob can decode the hidden
message T as he has the secret-key K. He retrieves T
bit by bit checking the pixels Si of the stego-image S he
received by applying:
Ti :=
{
0, if Si = Ki
1, if Si 6= Ki. (2)
In practice, there exists the possibility that Ki = Ci,
which leads to a bit error if Ti = 1. To solve this issue,
T can already contain the required error correction in-
formation, such that it will not interfere with the rest of
the procedure. For a more detailed explanation we refer
to the Supplementary material and the proof-of-principle
experiment.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The stego-image S is a digital picture that could have
been drawn directly from the underlying distribution of
the genuine pictures K and C. The photographs K and
C naturally follow the same statistical distribution that
we denote by C. That is, the statistical distribution of
the key-image and the cover-image is seen as the statisti-
cal distribution of the cover-image of the usual stegano-
graphic framework [9]. The statistical distribution of
the stego-image S, denoted by S do not deviate from
C. That is possible because of Assumptions (i) and (ii)
stated at the beginning of the protocol. This means that
for each sample i of the statistical distributions, it holds
that C(i) = S(i). This leads to a zero Kullback-Leiber
divergence, meaning that the message T is carried by the
stego-image S without statistical distortions with respect
to C, i.e. the secret content is perfectly undetectable by
Ward. This leads to a perfectly secret steganographic
scheme. Furthermore, all the pixels available are used to
encode the message T , which has the same size of the the
images K, C, and S. Contrary to the common stegano-
graphic strategies, our protocol the amount of the data
embedded scales linearly with the image size.
Moreover, the protocol that we propose bares strong
similarities to the one-time pad (OTP). In OTP, to en-
code a bit ’0’, Alice choosing a bit from the key k, to
encode a bit ’1’ Alice chooses a bit from k¯. We replace k
and k¯ by the two images K and C. Our protocol there-
fore has the advantages, but also the requirements of the
OTP. In the next section, we show this formally, and gen-
eralize it to any provably-secure steganographic protocol.
V. PERFECT STEGANOGRAPHY IMPLIES
PERFECT CRYPTOGRAPHY
The definition of perfectly secure stegosystems pro-
posed by Cachin [11] parallels the one of perfectly se-
cret cryptosystems proposed by Shannon [19]. Below,
we show that any perfectly secure steganographic proto-
col is also a perfectly secret cryptographic protocol, and
must therefore have the same (or greater) requirements
in terms of key length and randomness.
Indeed, if it is impossible to detect the presence of a
message in the cover-image, it is also impossible to ex-
tract the message without knowledge of the key. This
can be proven by reductio ad absurdum: if Ward has ac-
cess to an eavesdropping function, he can use it to obtain
the message and therefore discover its presence. Perfect
steganography implies that it is impossible to detect a
hidden message, and consequently this implies that an
eavesdropping function can not exist.
More formally: Let us suppose that T is the space of
the messages to hide and S the space of the stego-images.
A steganographic protocol is a function P : T → S such
that P (T ) = S, for a certain S ∈ S and a certain T ∈ T .
The space of the steganographic protocols is denoted by
P. In this framework, a hypothesis test is a function
H : S → {0, 1} defined as follows:
H(S) :=
{
1 if there is a message within S
0 otherwise.
Let us suppose that a message T ∈ T has been embedded
using the protocol P ∈ P, generating the stego-image
S ∈ S. Furthermore, let us assume that the eavesdropper
Ward is able to extract the message T . This means that
there exists an eavesdropping function EP ∈ E able to
break the protocol P . More precisely,
∃EP ∈ E such that EP (S) = T,
where EP : S → T , from which Ward can infer that
H(S) = 1. However, a perfectly secret steganographic
scheme R ∈ P is perfectly undetectable, so that for any
stego-image S ∈ S generated using R behaves like a com-
mon image, so that for a T ∈ T
S = R(T )⇒ H(S) = 0.
This is in contrast to the result H(S) = 1, which Ward
can infer if EP exists, implying that EP cannot exist,
and any perfectly secure steganographic scheme is also a
perfectly secure cryptographic scheme.
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FIG. 3. Illustration of the proposed protocol: first, Alice and Bob meet. Alice takes two “identical” photographs K and C
and gives a copy of K to Bob as a key. They then separate. At a later date, Alice encodes her cleartext with the help of the
key-image K and the cover-image C into a stego-image S. She then published this stego-image where Bob can retrieve it. With
K and S in hand, Bob is able to extract the cleartext from S.
5VI. EXPERIMENT
An image sensor (CCD or CMOS) converts photons
that impinge on its pixels into electrons. Each absorbed
photon will generate a single electron. This charge is
converted into a voltage and digitised, so if there were no
technical noise, the digital values are a direct represen-
tation of the number of photons absorbed by the pixel.
Photons are emitted by the light source illuminating the
observed object at an unpredictable time, due to the laws
of quantum physics. The number of photons absorbed by
a sensor pixel during the exposure, follows the Poisson
distribution, and is fundamentally random. Therefore,
the standard deviation of the measured number of elec-
trons (photons) n will be
√
n. For most imagers, the
full-well capacity can be of 5× 104 , so n ∼ 104 , and the
standard deviation will typically be σ ∼ 100. This is
much larger than the noise levels of modern image sen-
sors, which is most often < 10 e−, and can be of the
order of a single electron in devices with small pixels,
such as the cameras of mobile telephones. The noise in
most photographs is therefore dominated by quantum
noise [17]. This type of noise arises from the quantum
nature of light and is omnipresent, the only exception
being “squeezed light” [20], which can only be created
in complex quantum-optical experiments. If the images
were noise-free, the protocol that we propose would not
work, as the key-image and cover-image would be iden-
tical.
We have performed the above protocol in two ways.
On one hand, we used a scientific monochrome camera.
Although unrealistic from a practical perspective, this
allows us to explore the theoretical framework without
color image processing. On the other hand, we used a
consumer color camera, which produces raw image files.
Alice’s pixel manipulations are carried out at the raw
image stage, although the image can be later processed.
These experiments, which are detailed in the Supple-
mentary Material, show that indeed quantum noise is
the dominant noise mechanism for both cameras. Fur-
thermore, we found that adjacent pixels are statistically
independent, showing that Assumption (ii) can be sat-
isfied [17]. For the scientific monochrome camera, the
image-to-image fluctuations were smaller than both the
shot noise and the typical efficiency fluctuations between
pixels, indicating that Assumption (i) can be satisfied.
With the commercial color camera, fluctuations in the
shutter speed introduced a measurable difference between
consecutive images. A threshold should be derived to
evaluate what fluctuations are acceptable for our assump-
tions to hold. Further details are given in the supplemen-
tary material, in particular, using more than one pixel to
encode each bit strongly increases the robustness of the
protocol with respect to image manipulation and exper-
imental imperfections. Intuitively, the protocol is per-
fectly robust in the limit where Alice and Bob use an
entire image to encode each bit.
Our experimental demonstration illustrates how the
proposed protocol can be carried out. We show that
Ward cannot in principle know whether an image con-
tains hidden information, however, from Alice and Bob’s
perspective, further study is required to find all possible
problems and loopholes in the physical implementation
which could be exploited by Ward.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the answer to the question “can
Ward, at least in principle, make the decision of whether
a photograph contains any hidden information?” is “No”.
More precisely, we demonstrate that a provably secure
stegosystem is possible and propose a concrete protocol.
This proves that a photograph can carry a large amount
of hidden data whilst being indistinguishable, in a fun-
damental way, from a typical photograph. It also shows
that an unmodified photograph can be used as the key.
We show that any perfectly secure stegosystem is also a
perfectly secret cryptosystem, and has at least the same
requirements, i.e. the key must be at least as long as the
message and must be perfectly random. Randomness is
taken directly from the shot noise (quantum noise) which
is dominant in modern digital cameras. We conclude that
it is impossible to prohibit encrypted communications
without prohibiting the free exchange of photographs.
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Appendix A: Proof-of-Principle experiment
We have performed the above protocol in two ways.
On one hand, we used a scientific monochrome camera.
Although unrealistic from a practical perspective, this
allows us to explore the theoretical framework without
color image processing. On the other hand, we used a
consumer color camera, which produces raw image files.
Alice’s pixel manipulations are carried out at the raw
image stage. Note that strong error correction is needed
in case the stego-image is compressed into a JPEG. If
that is the case, also the algorithm on Bob’s side becomes
more complex.
1. Experimental Setup
The experimental setup consists of a monochrome sci-
entific camera (ATIK 383L+) mounted to an optical
bench. The noise of this camera is strongly dominated
by quantum shot noise, as it has been discussed in [17].
Moreover, we show that the statistical distribution of
pixel values are independent, meaning that Assumption
(ii) is satisfied. With respect to the pictures K and C,
the subject has to be static while they are taken. Any
variation of the experimental conditions would conflict
with a (i). The subject is a printed circuit board (PCB)
with some areas of strong contrast between the reflective
copper traces and dark board color. This saturates some
pixels and gives a predictable value, leading to errors
occurrence. These errors are useful for testing our er-
ror correction algorithm. To satisfy Assumption (i), we
used a DC-powered light-emitting diode (LED), which
provides a constant intensity level.
Exposure time of 100 ms ensures that each pixel, even
the dark ones, receive a sufficiently large photon num-
ber, such that the quantum noise dominates other pos-
sible noise types. A set of 100 photographs is taken in
order to verify the stability of the setup and the repeata-
bility of the measurements. All the photographs are 8
megapixels, encoded as 16 bit “tiff” files. Among these
photographs, only two of them are finally chosen and ac-
tually used to perform the protocol. Specifically, the first
one is employed as the key-image K, while the second one
as the cover-image C.
2. Protocol Implementation in Monochrome
The following protocol was implemented using the
Python programing language. A representation of the
functions, with real sample data, is shown in Fig. 4.
The protocol consists of the ten steps listed below. It
is assumed that Alice has already taken two photographs
K and C and securely shared K with Bob.
1. Alice choses the text to communicate to Bob. The
size of the text is at most one bit per pixel. In our
case this would be a maximum of 8 Mbits.
2. Alice encodes the text using the Reed-Solomon
code [21]. The required redundancy depends on the
image, and more or less space should be allocated
for error correction. In our tests, the error rate is
approximately 1%, due mostly to overexposed pix-
els. This requires the allocation of at least 2% of
the total space for error correction. Note that Al-
ice can herself test whether the redundancy is suf-
ficient or not, because she can locally perform all
Bob’s operations.
3. Alice places each byte of data in a specific region of
the image. The place where each byte is allocated
is predetermined but looks pseudorandom within
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Nuit a ma renommee et repugne mon ame.
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FIG. 4. Illustration of the full algorithm. The original text (1) is Reed-Solomon encoded (2). Each character is placed at a
pseudorandom position in the image with a mixing step (3). The data is converted to binary and padded as to fit the image
extents (4). All these steps are “pre-processing”; we consider the binary string obtained after step (4) as being the cleartext.
Step (5): steganographic encoding by choosing each pixel of the stego-image S from either K or C depending on the cleartext
value being 0 or 1 respectively. The following steps are performed by Bob. He compares S with his key-image K, to recover the
cleartext T ∗ (6). Note that step (5) cannot be fully reversed by step (6), due to the probability that Ki = Ci. The extracted
T ∗ therefore contains errors, which are recovered during a Reed-Solomon step (9) to yield the original text (10).
8Key-image A Stego-image SAuxiliary image B
FIG. 5. The three actual photographs as used in the proof-of-principle experiment. A printed-circuit board was chosen as it
goes towards satisfying our assumption of a static subject and presents a high-contrast image with some saturated pixels, which
will therefore have the same value in pictures K and A, and test the error-correction code.
the image. The placement list is obtained by shuf-
fling an ordered dictionary of the placement of each
byte. The shuffled dictionary is previously shared
with Bob and can be a constant. The purpose of
this “mixing” step is to optimise error correction
efficiency. Often, overexposed pixels are adjacent
and this would damage many bytes within a Reed-
Solomon block, making the data unreadable. The
mixing step allows for a homogeneous distribution
of the bytes within a block. This also leads to a
homogeneous distribution throughout the image it-
self, mixing even a larger overexposed area recov-
erable by means of error correction.
4. The data is converted to its binary representation
and padded such that there is exactly one bit per
pixel. The output of this step corresponds to the
message T introduced in the paper.
5. The stego-image S is created by K’s pixels where
T = 0 and C’s pixels where T = 1. Alice com-
municates the picture S to Bob through a public
channel, without raising suspicions.
6. Bob is already in possession of the key-image K
and receives the stego-image S. He retrieves the
message T ∗ by comparing each pixel pair (Si,Ki).
He sets T ∗i = 0 if Si = Ki and T
∗
i = 1 otherwise.
7. In the extracted message T ∗ errors occur in the
positions where Ki = Ai. Error correction is then
needed.
8. Bob records the bytes according to his dictionary.
Note that, unlike the error-locations, the dictionary
can be public. The dictionary does not have to be
carried by Bob, and will therefore not reveal his
intention to communicate to Ward.
9. Bob performs the Reed-Solomon error correction
(errors are highlighted in Red in Fig. 4.)
10. Bob gets the original text without errors.
We have performed the above protocol using two images
of a printed circuit board. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 6. Autocorrelation between adjacent pixels. “Pixel lag”
is the distance between pixels. Here, the autocorrelation is
calculated over the subtraction of two consecutive images, to
cancel out any static image feature. The curve labeled “the-
ory” represents the same process applied to images generated
using a pseudorandom Poisson distribution, and are used to
evaluate the finite-sample effects.
3. Protocol Implementation in Color and JPEG
We have also partially implemented a protocol simi-
lar to the one described above. Photographs taken by a
commercial colour camera are employed and these images
are published in a compressed file format, such as JPG.
This significantly increases he complexity of the system
and limits the amount of data that can be embedded.
Most colour image sensors are arranged in a Bayer pat-
tern, as shown in Fig 9. It consists of the red (R), the
green (G), and the blue (B) components, which are not
captured at the same site, but at different places. Every
pixel, however, requires each of a R,G and B component
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FIG. 7. Illustration of how the protocol might work for jpeg-compressed images: instead of using the images pixel by pixel, the
protocol would use blocks of 16x16 pixels, corresponding to the native jpeg processing size. Alice would choose a RAW block
either from RAW datas K or C, to encode a “0” or a “1” respectively. To decode the message, Bob would compares the image
to his key image (also jpeg) block by block.
to display the appropriate colour. This is done through
an interpolation process. For example a red pixel retains
its R value, but has associated the G and the B values,
resulting from the interpolation of adjacent pixels. If
any operation is applied after such interpolation process,
a.g. white balance, this will introduce some correlations
across the pixels and across the colour channels.
For the steganographic technique presented here, the
data embedding process (Step 5. above) must only act on
the raw image data. All the other processes must happen
at a later stage.
When no compression is applied, image processing
steps such as white balance and colour correction are
reversible, within numerical precision. Step 6. requires
an estimator which from a processed image will estimate
the most likely values for the captured sensor data for
each R, G and B pixel. The comparison between the
key-image K and the estimated pixel values from the
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FIG. 8. Representation of the mean difference between corre-
sponding pixels of two consecutive images, normalised to the
expected quantum deviation, which is the square root of the
photon number absorbed by the pixel. The mean normalised
deviation is 1.05± 0.1.
FIG. 9. Bayer pattern, used in most colour image sensors.
Each pixel only measures a single color channel, its full RGB
value is extrapolated from adjacent pixels (“debayering”),
however the value of it’s own color channel is not modified
by the algorithm, e.g. the R value of a red pixel is not af-
fected by debarring.
published stego-image S cannot be a strict equality, but
has to use an optimal “similarity” bound. Even with this
bound, we found that stronger error correction has to be
applied, typically 5%.
The JPEG image compression algorithm acts on 16x16
pixel blocks. When such compression is used, it is possi-
ble to embed a single pixel or several pixels per block. If
that is the case, then in Step 6. the block are compared,
rather than the pixels. This results in an information
capacity of 1/256 or less, as shown in Fig. 7.
Appendix B: Open Problems
“Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved
it correct, not tried it.” Don Knuth
Further research is needed to define a threshold above
which assumptions (i) and (ii) can be considered satis-
fied. Below, we present an assessment on the difficulty of
this task.
Assumption (ii) is easily satisfied: we have measured
the correlation in the noise between adjacent pixels and
found out that it is unmeasurably low. However, if this
remained a worry, it would be possible to use a subset
of non-adjacent pixels, leading to a even lower risk of
revealing some correlation. Fig. 6 shows that there is no
measurable correlation between adjacent pixels.
On the other hand, Assumption (i) is demanding: the
camera and scene are in general not in the same state
when two consecutive photographs are taken. For ex-
ample, a flying bird in the background or varying il-
lumination would make the stego-image identifiable as
such. Furthermore, the image noise would have to be of
quantum origin. This means that non-illuminated pix-
els, which present only classical noise, would have to re-
main unused during the protocol. In fact, their employ-
ment would lead to a major risk of exposing the com-
munication. In principle, however, if larger areas of a
photographs are taken to encode a bit 0 or 1, the pro-
tocol does become secure. In the limit that each pho-
tograph encodes a single bit, the protocol is obviously
secure, and several bits can be sent by using several pho-
tographs. Further work would be required to find at what
the right compromise would be. For 40 image pairs, we
measured the average difference in the corresponding pix-
els between the two photographs, and compare it to the
expected deviation given only quantum noise. That is,
we plot the mean of (Ki−Ci)/
√
Ki, where Ki and Ci are
similar, and normalised to represent photon numbers, so√
Ki is the expected quantum noise. Results are shown
in fig. 8.
These differences arise from several factors, one of
which is varying image illumination: we have tested a
Canon Single Lens Reflex camera, an ATIK scientific
camera and a Nokia mobile telephone camera, under sev-
eral lighting conditions. Taking two consecutive pictures
of the same subject, the exposure changes between 0.01%
and 5%. Small differences can be given by effects which
are as subtle as sound pressure level, as shown in [22].
